SM: This is an interview with Dr. James L. McGaugh on August 16, 1989 in HOB-360. Now, Jim, it's a pleasure to have you here. And I'd like the first question, taking up your teaching and research first, I'd like you to in layman's terms to tell me what you're doing in memory, and what the center generally does. But you're in a nice building, I hear.

JM: Okay. What I study is, in the broadest sense, is the neural basis of memory, what goes on in the brain when we learn. And in a narrower sense, my work focuses primarily on the influences within the brain that regulate the storage of new information. And, in particular, I work on the role of hormones and what are called neuro-modulators. That is, chemical substances in the brain that influence the activity of neurons. And the specific experiments involve studies of the effects of administration of hormones and examining the places in the brain where hormones act to influence the storage of information. And I have devised a theoretical scheme that accounts for these modulatory influences. Now, in a very . . . Let me put it in a very simple-minded sense. We can ask the question the other way. Why is it that we remember important things? And my answer to that is we
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remember important things because the neuro-modulatory systems in the body and in the brain become activated and instruct the brain to store that information. And so, in a very general sense, I work on why it is that the significance of events is well-correlated with the remembrance of events.

Now, more broadly within the Center, the Center consists of eleven faculty members and their post-doc[toral] graduate students, technicians, undergraduate students and colleagues and so on, who were brought together to focus, from a multi-disciplinary point of view on how it is that the brain stores information in a way that can be used. And the research varies from a much more molecular perspective. That is, from the intracellular machinery of the brain, which is worked on by some colleagues, through our research on how brain systems cooperate with each other, all the way up to studies of learning and memory in animals and in humans, and including even patients with memory disorders. That consists of eight faculty from UCI from a variety of departments and three from other UC campuses. And I think it works reasonably well as a multi-disciplinary research center.

SM: And it's very exciting. Very exciting, Jim. Tell me, does your work . . . Does anybody on your group have anything to do . . . There was a big article about depressions and they said that they were hormonal and that mood elevating medicines, such as Elavil and Tofranil and so on, that they're
going further on the hormonal side. Do you have any of your people doing that?

JM: No, nobody works specifically on that, although I work in some cases with drugs--for studies of memory--drugs that are used for other purposes, including drugs for the treatment of anxiety. I use those extensively because those . . . valium, for example, and there's a whole class of drugs . . . valium . . .

SM: Stelazine?

JM: Probably so.

SM: For anxiety.

JM: Yes. These are called collectively benzodiazepines and they have very powerful effects on memory, impairing memory. So, if you take these--and different ones have different effects, so that there are some of them that produce very extensive what we call anterograde amnestic effect. That is, they will--when you take the drug--they will cause a loss of memory of things that you are about to learn.

SM: Is that right?

JM: That's right. So, people can take these in order to get a good night's sleep, go on a trip, come back, and not remember having been on the trip. So, I use these as tools. That is, I'm not interested in the anti-anxiety aspect of it.

SM: Yes.
JM: But here's a drug which is anti-anxiety and it has a memory effect and so we use it to study memory.

SM: Very interesting. Now, Jim, we're all very proud of you because the bulk of your work was done here, as against, say, Miledi. And you are a twenty-five year man from UC Irvine and you've become elected . . . been elected to the National Academy of Sciences. And this must . . . Does this open up all sorts of (inaudible) for you and opportunities for special lectures and books and things?

JM: Well, it probably [does]. Since I got elected, there are two or three things that have come up that I suspect are sort of related to that notoriety. But I'd put it another way. As it happened, I got elected . . . Just two days after I got elected to the Academy of Sciences, I got elected as President of the American Psychological Society, which is a new scientific society that has over 7,000 members. And I think those events are, I would like to think, correlated in the sense that after all these years of getting a little national recognition for (inaudible).

SM: Wonderful. Did you go to the meeting in New Orleans (inaudible)?

JM: No. That's a different society. I was the chief scientific advisor of that society, but that society is becoming more and more of a professional guild with less science. So, this new organization, you might say, it's a bunch of a rump
organization. (inaudible) has put this one together. But in any case, this is an organization of already 7,000 scientists. That is, it's pure scientists. There's no applied . . . I'm sorry, there's no purely applied people in it. They have to be research-oriented.

SM: I understand.

JM: And I got elected as the first president. So, my short answer to that is I think that I'm getting, if I can say modestly, I'm getting a fair amount of recognition.

SM: Great, great.

JM: And that happens when you maybe get to a certain age.

SM: Well, that's wonderful. I think that getting the National Academy appointment just now . . .

JM: Yes, that's not too bad.

SM: By the way, what do you think of this coat? I'm speaking at the Forum today.

JM: You look pretty fancy.

SM: And Jim, do you want to know how much this cost in Bangkok? Seventy-five dollars.

JM: Is that right?

SM: Yes, and made in forty-eight hours.

JM: Is that right?

SM: The trousers were forty dollars. Now I'm going to speak. I hope I can persuade you next fall, in the winter, to speak to
the Forum. You've spoken before but you've always got something new to say.

JM: Well, I won't be here very much this fall. I'm leaving, Becky and I are leaving for Germany in September. We'll be gone for six weeks—so (inaudible).

SM: Oh, I was thinking of the winter or the spring.

JM: Okay. That's entirely possible.

SM: Well, I'll get in touch with you then. I'm the moderator.

JM: If I don't have something new to say, I'm in the wrong business.

SM: (inaudible) me too. We're going out on a trip around France starting two weeks from today. No, two weeks from Monday.

JM: How long are you going to be gone?

SM: It's a sixteen-day trip. (inaudible) I'll be in one of those bus tours.

JM: Yes.

SM: I'm going to take Kodachrome slides. I've been teaching Western Civ. for years and I just can't wait to see Avignon, you know. I've been talking all about the (inaudible) and the great (inaudible) and so on.

Now, turning to your students, Jim. Are we getting good jobs for our Ph.Ds. (inaudible)?

JM: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. Now, one has to bear in mind that in the field that I'm in, my students don't go out to regular academic jobs from here. That'd be very rare because the
standard thing is to go for a three- or even four-year post-doctoral fellowship someplace. So, the question is: Do they get good initial placements for their post-doctoral fellowships? And the answer is decidedly yes. But beyond that, if you take Psychobiology as a whole--let's take the department as a whole . . . And we've created a large number of highly competitive departments throughout the world that are essentially run by people who got their training at Irvine.

SM: Right.

JM: I mean, they're just some outstanding people. But we also have, in addition to people who have gone out to become academics, one of my own Ph.Ds. has ended up within the Office of Naval Research as the head of all life sciences research. He's got a research budget of maybe $50 million that he's responsible . . . or of which he's responsible. So that, we've not only had impact in cloning ourselves--that is, having people like we do--but are also people who are beginning to have . . . not beginning to, but have for some years, had a major impact the science policy in the United States in the area of brain and behavior.

SM: Well, that's very (inaudible) And again, Ed Steinhaus was your leader?

JM: Ed Steinhaus is the wizard of all of this because it was Ed who had the brilliant idea, I think, that Psychobiology ought
to be developed within Biological Sciences because, as he put it, it was too important to be left for psychologists alone. A big insult for psychologists, but he's the one who launched it right.

SM: I remember that. Now, turning to your very fine record of administration, how many times have you been Chair of Psychobiology?

JM: Sad to say, three times. And I say "sad to say" because the first one was a great opportunity. That is, to come here in 1964 and found the department. I mean, who could ask for anything more exciting, interesting, rewarding . . . I mean, it was just an incredible experience. I did that, and then, as a favor to Ed Steinhaus who wanted to take sabbatical leave, I was talked into becoming Acting Dean in his absence. And then, as you know, sadly, he died and I became the Dean then, and I did that for two more years, or Dean for three years. I must say I did not like being Dean. I think I have spoken about that before. I didn't find that . . . It was not suited to me, that particular job.

But I loved being Chair of the Department of Psychobiology and having a role in founding it. Then I was called back when Howard Schneiderman came as Dean. He asked me to serve as Department Chair, and I did, and that was interrupted when I became the Vice Chancellor--Academic Vice Chancellor--and then (inaudible)
SM: Was that 1974?

JM: I became Vice Chancellor, actually accepted in 1974. And since Carl Hartman had been told he was going to be acting until the end of December, officially, I became Vice Chancellor in January 1975. But I was getting ready to do it starting about in October of that year. In any case, for the preceding three years--that must have been 1971 or 1972 to 1975, something like that--I was Department Chair. And then I just finished another . . . just about a three-year term, just short of three years. But I put that in the category of trying to be a decent citizen. But it's simply not as much fun the third time around. I mean, I've been a Department Chair before. There are no secrets and it's a hard job.

SM: It is a hard job.

JM: I would much prefer not to do it. And I'm not now doing it.

SM: Now, then, let's take a look at your Department of Psychobiology and the problems of the School of Biological Sciences. And your (inaudible) is Smith, is it? Dennis?

JM: Dennis Smith, yes.

SM: Yes. And is he . . . What's his area?

JM: He's a developmental biologist, but a certain molecular biologist working on developmental problems.

SM: And what . . . Well, let's go back to your being Dean. What was facing you when you took over as Acting Dean for Ed?

JM: Oh, that was . . . as I think you may recall, that was . . .
SM: That was 196 . . .

JM: It was two years after (inaudible).

SM: Let's see, he died in 1969.

JM: That was 1967.

SM: He died in October, 1968. October.

JM: Yes, 1967 is when I became Dean, I think. 1967 to 1970, I think, were the three years that I was Dean. First of all, we all have to understand that I did it as a favor to Ed because he was really very tired. He was weary and really needed sabbatical leave. And Jack Peltason talked me into it. And ..... said you just try to do it and so on, because I had no interest in doing that kind of thing. Then, when I was into it for a little period of time, then, because Ed announced his resignation and then died shortly thereafter, and I frankly felt like an orphan at that point.


JM: Yes, but he had already resigned.

SM: Yes. Oh, yes, yes.

JM: See, he'd resigned and said he was not coming back. And I felt orphaned first when he said he was not coming back. Because all of a sudden, the full impact that I was sitting there . . . And then further orphaned because he was a very wise counselor. I spent a lot of time talking with him about things.
Now, that period, I would say, was a period of major disaster and calamity for the School of Biological Sciences, because that was right when the medical school was foisted on us from the outside. And it would be bad enough if it was foisted and we still had Ed and we had everything intact so we could work with them. But as it happened, Jack Holland, who was really one of the leaders within the School of Biological Sciences in Molecular and Cell Biology, left to go to San Diego. And he left because he said he didn't want the fuss that was going to have to take place when the Medical School came.

And medical schools on a campus generally are not good for biological sciences because all of the interest is really in the medical school and biology gets seen as being second-class in most places.

And secondly, that was by everybody's understanding, the worst medical school in the United States, which was being attached to us and it was in a decrepit state. And so, I had the unhappy task of trying to deal with the administration and with the medical school to see that it came to the campus on the terms that would most favor the campus and, frankly, favor Biological Sciences also. So, I had lots of meetings with Warren Bostick and lots of meetings with Roger Russell then over what the—and with the Chancellor, also—over what the relationship was going to be.
SM: Well, I've interviewed Roger, about a couple of months ago, and Roger (inaudible) said (inaudible) that medical school.
JM: Yes.
SM: (inaudible) created something than (inaudible) he could do it himself.
JM: Yes. Well, this was bad news because they brought with them really decrepit basic science departments. I mean, they were just nothing, just terrible basic science departments. And so, I got the Chancellor to agree that we would have the sole authority for the graduate degrees in all of the areas of Biological Sciences. And that meant that any faculty member that was appointed to the Medical School would have to have a joint appointment in the School of Biological Sciences, in order to have graduate students. So, that meant the Dean of Biology had to sign off also, and that was a way of getting some quality control.

And also, we fought to make sure that there would be no basic science departments developed for a while because we didn't want the existing chairs of the basic sciences to clone themselves because they were so mediocre. So, we were . . . I was called Black Bart by the people in the medical school. I think I was even voted to censure, because there was a censure vote against me in the medical school for the stance that I took, which was . . .

SM: Black Bart? B-A-R-T?
JM: B-A-R-T. I was a bad guy. I was a bad guy over there.
SM: Yes, I never heard that expression.
JM: And the intent of all of this was to try to exert as much quality control over the development of the Medical School from the School of Biological Science's perspective. Whether that was correct to do or incorrect, or right or wrong, I don't know, but it was an effort that we had to make in order—we felt—in order to avoid being flooded by mediocrity in areas that are closely related. You have to imagine what it would be like if all of a sudden something else came here with... Suppose Backward State Teacher's College came here with a History Department. You can imagine what you'd feel, right?
SM: Oh, yes.
JM: So, you'd want to take steps to see to it. Because what the Medical School does, in effect, is duplicate Biological Sciences departments. And you want to make sure, if there is going to be duplication, that they are as high quality as you possibly can (inaudible).
SM: Where was Dean Ralph Gerard? Was he on your side, wasn't he, on that? (inaudible)
JM: Well, he wasn't necessarily on our side because he took an early view that you really didn't have to have strong basic science training in order to be a medical doctor, believe it or not. And he had big disagreements with Sherm... Mellinkoff,
the Dean at UCLA. They even had a debate at one time on this. And Ralph got hold of a study that was done by somebody, pointing out that several years down the road after people got their M.D. degrees, you couldn't tell whether they came from a first-class or a fifth-class medical school. Well, I think that says more about how medicine is practiced than how people are trained, if you want my view. But Ralph took a soft view on this, and CCM thought that Ralph was really great because it says that you can have a weak medical school and your products will be very, very good. That was essentially the position. So, Ralph was not a big help on this.

And a lot of this was seen as a political battle, unfortunately. That is, a political battle with Biological Sciences just wanting political control. Well, it was a political element. Yes, it was true that Biological Sciences wanted the control over this, but not control for control's sake. Control because it was essential to maintaining quality standards around this place, which CCM did not then represent. Nor did Bostick, in my view, have the foggiest idea about what had been the problem.

So, that was the . . . The three years that I was in there, I would say, if there were other issues, I don't recall what they were because this was omnipresent.

SM: So, what you're saying to question five is .... the medical school. (inaudible)
JM: Well, I felt (inaudible) the medical school.

SM: (inaudible)

JM: Yes. And with all the things that flowed from that. For example, I had to set about recruiting a Chair of the Department of Molecular and Cell Biology. And you have to understand what all this meant. Remember, we were all very young. So, when John Holland left, he must have been thirty-seven years old, let's say. But all the people that he hired were in their late twenties or early thirties, so that the entire department left behind were kids. And here was a kid--I was thirty-six years old. I was the father then of this group that probably averaged thirty years old in that department. And that, by the way, is a key department. Molecular Biology is a key department in Biological Sciences.

(tape is turned off)

SM: Here we go. (inaudible)

JM: Well, anyway, just let me finish this point. It's that it wasn't just that the Medical School was here and I was trying to deal with the administration. But there were problems within the School of Biological Sciences that had to be dealt with in respect to that, you see, like Holland leaving and all of the business then. We had to help recruit people in the Medical School. Once I said they couldn't come here unless we agreed, then we had to help with the recruiting of it. So,
we took on an added burden when we were young and overworked already,

SM: Who became the new Chair of Molecular and Cell Biology?

JM: Bob . . . you know. I'm sorry, I'm blocking on that one. He's still here. He just retired.

SM: Bob Warner?

JM: Yes, I recruited him. I went to the Algonquin Hotel in New York City and recruited him away from NYU. {inaudible}.

SM: I've got a question . . .

JM: I mean, taking time away from my . . . I was a kid, taking time away from my research. I had to go out and get a department chair in New York City because John Holland left and went to San Diego. I mean, that's a hell of a thing to ask anybody to do.

SM: You know, I take it . . . I talked to . . . I interviewed John back in 1974 and I said to him that you went to a lot of medical schools. San Diego had a medical school.

JM: Yes, I know. I know. But that was different. The Biological Sciences were very, very strong, and they had no basic science departments within the medical school. See, what they do, the medical school has clinical departments and then for their basic sciences . . . (telephone rings)

SM: Excuse me. That's Jaime's [telephone].
JM: For their basic sciences, they utilize people who are in the existing departments, you see. So, they have a very, very different approach (inaudible).

SM: Oh, oh, well. I guess I'm going to (inaudible) on that with John. I was more concerned then with what he did and how things were managed.

JM: And there's another point . . . is that when he decided to leave . . . You leave because you're . . . At that point, he left because he was angry, disaffected, and so on. He might have gone lots of places. He might have gone to a worse place, as far as that's concerned. But he did not like what was going on here. And he said he did not want to have his career disrupted by having to deal with this garbage of a, you know, hundredth-ranked medical school coming in.

SM: And Dan Aldrich said . . . I think he said (inaudible). He said, "(inaudible) medical school which was ranked eighty-sixth out of eighty-five." Eighty-sixth out of eighty-five! (laughter)

JM: That's right. And, of course, Dan, with his boy scout attitude, says, you know, "We'll take anything and we'll make something out of it." But the "we" turned out to be guys like me.

SM: Yes.

JM: And we got chewed up in the process. That was a very unhappy period in the history of this university.
SM: Well, then, let's turn to [question] six and your work as the Academic Vice Chancellor. (inaudible) first, what were your dates as Academic Vice Chancellor? (inaudible) and serving in 1985.

JM: Nineteen seventy-five.

SM: Nineteen seventy-five, excuse me.

JM: Nineteen seventy-five to nineteen seventy-eight, I think.

SM: And then Executive Vice Chancellor to 1981.


SM: Well, what . . . I can answer this in part. What were the problems you faced, that you feel that you . . . ?

JM: Well, there were several problems. The biggest one that I believed was the problem when I came in was the organization of the campus and the lack of coordination of the administrative efforts. And I would put the second one as being the biggest problem.

It's that we essentially had three different units running the campus. We had Academic Affairs, we had Business and Finance under L. E. Cox, and we had Student Affairs under Jack Hoy. And there simply was no coordination. Dan, as you know, is a very gentle soul underneath the bravado and he let each Vice Chancellor pretty much do what he chose to do, in terms of planning. And this caused lots of problems because some of the organizational sub-units were misplaced. For example, Budget was under L. E. Cox. Now I can imagine why
Accounting and Payroll should be there, but not Budgeting, which should be driving things. There was no planning. There was no planning, to the extent that planning was physical planning. So, the physical planning was driving the campus. And in a very fundamental sense, you might say that the campus was largely being run by L. E. Cox who was, after all, an army colonel.

SM: Army colonel and engineer.

JM: Engineer who was good at building maybe airport runways in Taipei or something like that.

SM: (laughter)

JM: But we didn't have any academic planning machinery and we had no mechanism for coordinating the activities. We had, let's say registration, Registrar's Office reporting to one sub-unit and the Admissions Office to another one and Housing to yet another one, with no coordination among that. I mean, you can imagine how that is when you want new students to come, to have no coordination as to who was being admitted, who was being registered, and who's providing Housing and who's providing Financial Aid, and so on. That wasn't being taken care of.

There was no relationship between the academic needs of the campus and the physical planning for buildings. I'm saying, no, it was just sort of . . . L. E. Cox was doing his thing, deciding which building was going to be built next and
some sequence there, and I felt that the Academic Vice Chancellor was not well-positioned in that administrative hierarchy at all, not well positioned. And I would say that that was the major problem getting that coordinated.

So, what did I do? I invented something called the Executive Council or Executive Cabinet. I even forget what it was called. And just appointed myself Chair of it and invited the other Vice Chancellors to participate in it and Dan was always there if he wanted to be. And we would sort of chew on things and then give them to Dan, if he wasn't there. Or, if he was there, argue out all of the problems in (inaudible).

SM: What was the title?

JM: Executive Cabinet.

SM: And that started in what year?

JM: Well, as soon as I got in I created the Executive Cabinet.

SM: You did that right away.

JM: Yes, right off the bat. And it wasn't until several years later that I got named the Executive Vice Chancellor with those people reporting to me. But, frankly, I acted in that council as though they reported to me. I mean, it was light-handed, but I arranged for that meeting, they all came, and we dealt with all of the major business, administrative business of the university in that Executive Cabinet.
SM: Well, now, you made a very important decision, in my view, and the leaders on the faculty were very pleased. (inaudible) said to Jim Dunning or his operation, (inaudible) I want you to be under you [McGaugh] and Admissions should be, too. And I know enough about Hoy and his background. He's very proud of his work with Admissions and at Wesleyan and all that.

JM: I just pulled it. I just pulled it.

SM: And was it done right away?

JM: Right away.

SM: I've interviewed Jim . . .

JM: Within about six months.

SM: Well, Jim is . . .

JM: Yes.

SM: I've interviewed Jim. See, I'm putting things together. I see you, you see, (inaudible).

JM: Yes. Well, I just did that. That was one of the lack of coordination, that is . . .

SM: Yes, absolutely. I know it.

JM: Admissions was off there. And you see, Jack Hoy was doing all kinds of strange things with his money. He was running essentially a shadow university. He would hire people who were Ph.Ds. because he felt that was important and they then would teach classes which was just sort of this . . . in the dormitory teaching sort of thing, and so on. I tried to convince him. I said, "Look, I don't care whether your people
have Ph.Ds. or not. They're not hired because they're going to be faculty. They're hired because they have jobs to do. They're going to be counselors. They're going to be admissions officers. They're going to be this and that and they should be professionals in what they do and don't worry about the degrees. But John was a degree gatherer and he thought that that guy . . . What was his name? He hired as assistant . . .

SM: Mel Weinstein or something?  

JM: Yes, what was it?

SM: He was an attorney.

JM: He had a law degree and Ph.D.

SM: He had a law degree from Harvard.

JM: He was a jerk.

SM: He was horrible.

JM: An absolute jerk. But, you see, that's what Jack did. He accumulated his people with degrees, saying that would make him important. Well, I had to deal with that. And I would say I saw that as a major overriding problem. We had no planning machinery. We had no coordinating machinery. The campus was just like this, okay? And my view was, and I told Dan this and we were very clear. Dan and I did not disagree on this. I said when you're getting started up, it's clear that you've got to have physical features here to make it happen. But at a certain point, we had to shift it over and
have the academics drive it because then we were beginning to know what we were.

SM: Yes.

JM: You see, if you're going to build a new library, let's say, in a town, you can get library consultants and build a library. But once the town is there and you want to expand the library, then you have to take account of whose there, who uses it, what happens, what it is and so on.

SM: Yes.

JM: And I said, using metaphors like that to Dan, I said now we have to put . . . The academic considerations have got to be the very first considerations that we have, and then we decide what we're going to do with this, whether we're going to have this, whether we're going to have that, and so on. And that was the argument that led to my becoming Executive Vice Chancellor, that it made sense. He felt very comfortable with that after a period of time.

Now, when you're talking about the academic planning, I created at that time the Academic Planning Council, and I did that because I felt that it was a mistake to have every Dean coming to the Vice Chancellor begging for coins and trying to make some individual case without some idea of whether it made sense for the whole campus, particularly when the resources were terribly short. Every FTE was precious, as you know, in those days.
So—and this will deal with one of the points that you're going to raise later about the relations with the Senate, I created the Academic Planning Council. I put on it key administrators who had to be involved in planning, like the Dean of the Graduate Division and so on, but I also put on it the Chairs of the major Senate committees. And I said that's how we're going to get the Senate involved in the planning operation, is that they are the de facto members of the most important planning committee on this campus.

SM: Yes.

JM: And I deliberately chose not to go to the Committee on Planning and Budget to do that, and I did so for several reasons. One is, it wouldn't have on it the key administrative people who have all the factual knowledge and all the support staff, and the turnover is very high. You have a different set of faces every year to deal with that. And I felt that that would just not give you the continuity that's needed, or do the planning. But that meeting, the group, if you add them up, had more people there by virtue of their Senate membership than by virtue of their administrative membership. So, I think that's important for you to know because you have a question about my relation with the Senate.

SM: Yes.

JM: My strategy was to draw the Senate into the major decision making via that kind of a mechanism. And I think that, for
the time, the Academic Planning Council was one of my proudest achievements, because it got out in the public the planning process. People knew that you couldn't go to the Vice Chancellor and make a deal.

SM: Yes, to get an FTE.

JM: To sneak an FTE or get one for whatever reason, because it was Monday or something like that. You got it after a rational process of explaining what it was you were trying to do, reviewing what your resources were, a recommendation of that, and then the Vice Chancellor would make a decision. And I made decisions which went against the recommendations because I wasn't persuaded. But at least it was on the record with regard to how the Senate felt about it, how my administrative colleagues felt about it, and so on. And I felt that was pretty good.

By the way, I should say parenthetically I think that today, the way we operate now, I think it's equally wrong to have that committee. I think it should be disbanded. Because now, we have lots of resources, lots of FTEs, and that committee, in my view, should be more of a policy guidance committee. You shouldn't go there... A Dean is going to have, let's say, twelve new positions coming up in the next several years. He should not have to go there and argue case by case about what each and every one of these people are going to be doing. But in those days, we might have had zero
FTE in one year, or one new FTE in one year, or five the next year.

SM: I hear you saying then, Jim, having set up that organization, though . . . I guess it was, you know, Leon Schwartz or somebody--maybe it was Dan--there are $400 million worth of construction going on.

JM: Yes.

SM: (inaudible) you (inaudible) property going in (inaudible).

JM: You see, that ought to be the kind of thing that the Academic Planning Council is dealing with, policy issues about what our academic needs are and where we should grow. Should there be a law school? I mean, these kinds of things. And they should not be saying, "Is this FTE going to go to Engineering or is it going to go to Biology?"

SM: Yes, right.

JM: We had to use the committee in that way because we weren't building new buildings. We didn't have very many new FTE, but I wanted to have the faculty as a whole satisfied that the process was fair, [that] we were doing things in a rational way, and I do. I think it worked.

SM: Well, I think that worked. I think they were.

JM: But I think that committee now is doing the wrong thing. It should not be looking line item at each little tiny resource, because that's just clogging up the machinery. What I'm
saying is I'm telling you there are different organizations for different times.

SM: (inaudible) there's a time (inaudible)

JM: That's right. There's a time for it. I created an organization which I believed to be highly appropriate for that time, and it worked well. If I were Executive Vice Chancellor today, I would organize the campus differently. I can see different needs and different (inaudible) but it's still (inaudible) along with the same (inaudible) operation.

SM: And (inaudible) you would feel satisfied that all this physical planning that's going on now is probably done and that we're getting the right buildings. Physical Science and Bio Sci II.

JM: I think that it . . . Yes. I think that we've always done a pretty good job of planning here. And even in the early days you can see, yes, we got the right collection of buildings here to get the campus started. But that's a different kind of planning. The shifting of gears took place when I came in and we said we should not make decisions about what we're going to do with regard to buildings and other resources, until we know what we're like and what we want.

SM: Right, right.

JM: And that was what I tried to do by creating the Executive Council, creating the Academic Planning Council, and then I
had this extra group, the . . . What did I call it? The advisory group that just came in . . .

SM: APC?

JM: No. I had an advisory group just consisting of some of the . . . It was kind of like in a cabinet.

SM: A cabinet, yes.

JM: A kitchen cabinet of senior . . . Fred Reines was on it and Abe Melden and people like that, who would just come once a month and tell me what was on their mind. And I would tell them what was on my mind. It linked every school and unit on the campus, had somebody who was on that advisory group to me. And, well, it was out of that that we got the Distinguished Professor Program.

SM: Oh, really?

JM: That was created as a consequence of that advisory group. And that advisory group was the first group to make judgments about who should be invited. That was how that got started. It was their idea. They came and said we should do that.

SM: (inaudible)

JM: No, I disbanded them in the last two years I was Executive Vice Chancellor because I felt that that, too, had run its course.

SM: Yes.

JM: But we got a lot of things going and nobody was upset about disbanding (inaudible). I feel, when I came in the campus
needed to tap the intellectual resources and the energy of 
lots of people, so I created some vehicles for doing that. 
And if they worked, I kept them. And then when they ran their 
course, we dropped it. It was sort of fluid in that sense, 
and I thought it worked rather well.

Now, you're asking me where the problems were. Let me 
tell you another problem that we faced, and that is a lack of 
growth at a time when lots of things were incomplete around 
here. And, as you know, there was a decline in student 
enrollment in campuses throughout the country, so one of the 
biggest problems I felt we faced here was maintaining our 
enrollments. So, we did.

SM: (inaudible) turn it over. It's got a lot to go.

JM: Okay. We did lots of things to try to make sure that our 
enrollments were solid. We did lots of things to try to 
ensure that whatever money was available for space from 
system-wide administration that we went after it and got it. 
There was, in my view, a danger of UCI as not being seen as 
a major contender as a research university. So, I took a lot 
of steps to see that the things that we said about ourselves 
reflected . . .

SM: Our contributions?

JM: And reflected more of a research university statement than 
just a small college statement. So, I tried to get our public 
relations attitude changed around. Attitude Adjustment Hour,
I used to call it. So, I had more coordination among the units. I started . . . I think I influenced how it is that we represent ourselves to the public. And we made great efforts to maintain and increase our enrollments, and we worked very hard with system-wide administration to see that we could get whatever space was available. And I think we did better than, frankly, any other campus during that period of time in getting whatever space monies were around—or at least as well as any other campus. Let's not overstate it.

SM: Now, back to the Medical School in question eight. And the Medical School . . . you talked about when you were Dean and you were Chairman. And now you're Vice Chancellor. How did that work?

JM: Well, things changed. Because as Dean I was worried about the survival of the School of Biological Sciences and quality and so on. Now, when I became Vice Chancellor, I wouldn't say that the quality of the Medical School was assured, but it was a hell of a lot better. It was a better Medical School. We probably were up to a rank thirtieth or fortieth, or something of that kind, by that time. I believe that to be true. I think there are some numbers in there because they have a regular ranking system. They do that every year.

SM: Right. I'll check it.

JM: And I think we were about at that number. The problems were different. The problems then was the relationship between the
Medical School and the hospital. That was the driving question. Because in the meantime, we had purchased the .. . had been given and purchased the hospital from the County of Orange. That became our teaching hospital. And we inherited a hospital director who had been the director of a county hospital.

SM: Who was that?

JM: Bob White. Bob White was the Director, and he carried with him a lot of administrative baggage that was, let's say, attitudinal. You know, when you're running a county hospital, that's different from running a research hospital with a university.

SM: What was the word you used? Attitudinal?

JM: Attitudinal?

SM: How do you spell it?

JM: Attitude, as in attitude.

SM: Oh, attitudinal! I didn't hear you.

JM: Attitudinal, yes. He had an attitudinal problem.

SM: I had my hearing checked two weeks ago and I'm losing the top ones.

JM: (whispering) I'm having mine checked next week.

SM: Uh-oh.

JM: Anyway, that van den Noort and Bob White did not get along at all, at all. And they were always firing shrapnel at each other. The hospital problems were different then from the
problems that we have now. We had what was called a "sweetheart contract" with the county, because they simply agreed to reimburse us for all services we provided. It was a very nice contract. But the problem is, when they found out what the price tag was, they refused to pay. They said, "No, we don't want this." So, they hired a physician who would go through all of our bills and just disallow them—unilaterally disallow. And the difference between what they owed us and what they paid became larger and larger and larger and larger. So, that's the kind of problem I had with the county, trying to deal with that.

The facilities were totally inadequate. And that affected the Medical School because we couldn't recruit people. That was our only hospital, and the hospital facilities were not only badly located, but they were terrible. We didn't have the new wing. We didn't have all the remodeling and so on. So, I had a problem of trying to coordinate the hospital needs.

Also, by the way, the hospital had its own police, its own accounting, its own payroll, its own everything—everything—when it came. And I had to coordinate that and put the campus, really, in charge of that operation. And that was very difficult to do because they thought . . . They thought that the line of organization was from the Chancellor to the Hospital Director over there and then everything under
the Hospital Director. And mine was no, it's the Chancellor to accounting, and accounting to the hospital. It's, you know, everything is the university and that's part of it. And I had to get hold of the planning and I had to get hold of the police. I mean, the physical planning--everything--had to be coordinated because it had not been. That was just a problem. Well, it ended up probably consuming probably 90 percent of my time. And I'm not kidding you when I tell you I worked seven days a week at that job.

SM: Oh, I know you did. I know you did.

JM: And I worked many eighteen-hour days. Many, many, many eighteen-hour days. I don't think there was... When I was in town, I don't think there was a Sunday in my eight years that I wasn't here in my office working on that. And people used to see that fifth floor light burning night after night after night, because I'd have meetings there in the evening and so on. And most of that--not all of it--most of it, after let's say 1978 in particular, when I became Executive Vice Chancellor, most of it was dealing... I wouldn't say with the hospital or with the Medical School, but at the interface. And that was run by an organization I set up called the Clinical Services Council, which met once a week, and which...

SM: And was someone Chair of that?

JM: I was Chair of that.
SM: You were Chair.

JM: Just as I was Chair of the Executive Cabinet also. And that included the Dean and the Deans from the hospitals, all of his immediate associates, the Director of Budget on the campus, and so on—all the right kind of people to do with that interface. And Dan came to some but not all of those. But that's the way we ran that interface. It was kind of hard because the Hospital Director and the Dean did not like each other. Bob White left shortly after I became Executive Vice Chancellor. That was a good thing.

SM: And did Gonzales come in?

JM: Yes, Gonzales came in. I recruited Gonzales.

SM: I liked him.

JM: Gonzales, in my opinion, did a very fine job. I think that he had a can tied around his tail. I think he had to be the scapegoat for that. Our problems are much worse now than they were when Gonzales was running the show over there. And that's just not that this person is any worse. It's just that the problems are indigenous and you can't correct it by putting in a new Hospital Director. I thought Gonzales was fine. But maybe somebody had to be a sacrificial lamb to get the Regents off of the campus.

SM: (inaudible) I liked him.

JM: Well, he was good. But let me just bring closure on that. That was a major problem we had to face there, and it kind of
chewed me up after a while. If I became disaffected over the years at all—and I don't think I really did, but if I did—it was because of the hospital problem. I grew very tired of that. And it's basically unsolvable. And the problem between the Medical School Dean and Hospital Director is also basically unsolvable because they're always going to dislike each other because it's like having two housewives in the same kitchen or two carpenters in the same shop.

SM: (chuckle) You've got lovely similes and metaphors going. I thought that... Who is the present Director who replaced Gonzales.

JM: Dicione, I think it is. *Checked spelling of name, Cicione?*

SM: Is it a woman?

JM: Yes, a woman. I don't know her.

SM: (inaudible)

JM: And I don't follow what's going on.

SM: Well, now, thanks, Jim, for that. That's enlightening. Now, as Chair of the Academic Senate, I enjoyed working with you. I thought we always used to get along fine. I thought when we had our quarrel (inaudible) you remember, we both we didn't see... So, we were having lunch every two weeks. (laughter)

JM: Well, let me jump in here. I think that, frankly, that you misread me on that. When you and I were meeting, the one sour point we had was over the bookstore.
SM: Oh, yes.

JM: That was the one sour point. And I want to explain my attitude toward the Senate so that there's no misunderstanding on this point. The Senate is ill-suited to run the university. There's turn-over in all of the committees, there's lack of continuity. People are elected. They may not be the right people to serve in the right posts, and so on. And so, my attitude . . . I have the same attitude toward the Senate as a faculty member as I did as administration. And that is that some of the committees work well and some don't work well. It depends upon who the people are.

The Regents and the . . . The Regents appoint the Chancellor, the Chancellor appoints the administrative staff, and the responsibility for the business, fiscal planning part of the university, lies with the Chancellor and administrative staff. The faculty has the full responsibility for the courses and the programs and so on, and the administration dare not tread into their territory.

SM: (inaudible)

JM: And that's where the tension is. How do you make all of this work? Now, my attitude was to try to draw the Senate into the planning process and the implement process as much as seemed reasonable to do, for example, by creating the Academic Planning Council. Nobody told me to create that. I did it. And I brought those key Chairs in so we'd put some light on
that process where none had been before. So, I want you to understand that my attitude is I reached out to the points where I thought the Senate could be effective, because it had the right people, the continuity, and so on, but I didn't turn to the Committee on Planning and Budget and say, "Help us decide how to spend the money this year."

Now, my view is that the Senate does best when it takes on very specific tasks or when it serves in a broad policy role. Now, let me give you examples of those. Specific tasks: the academic personnel.

JM: Jim, we're going to change this now.

(End of Side 1)

JM: Let me get back to my point. I said I think the Senate does best in two areas. One, when it has a very specific task to do or set of tasks. And the other is when it makes broad policy advice. I think one of the finest hours of the Senate is the Academic Personnel Committee. They give advice to the Chancellor on all the ... 

SM: Oh, the old Budget Committee.

JM: The old Budget Committee. I think that's the Senate almost in its finest hour, because they are exerting the quality control in the faculty.

SM: And they do, too.

JM: And they do. I think they do a very good job. And you may not have known about how I interacted with the Senate. But
I think if you talk with anybody who was on those committees . . .

SM: Oh, Jim, let me interrupt to say that you couldn't have done better. You'd go in . . . Many times you went in and talked to them. Other times the thing you sent to them, and you must have talked to one member, and the committee really appreciated it. And the department appreciated it. When you really went into something and overrode the APC.

JM: Yes. Well, I worked very closely with them. I took them very seriously. Sometimes I was scared to death to go in and meet with them because I knew my views were different from their's.

SM: Yes.

JM: But I didn't ignore them. I didn't just say, "Well, I disagree. Therefore, I won't meet with them." I've worked very closely with them and I think that the people who were on it will tell you that we had a very effective working relationship. So, I had a good relationship with that Senate committee throughout the years, all that years, (inaudible) over. I can't recall a time at which there was any disrespect or lack of understanding. Disagreements, yes. But there was never any . . . my feeling that they were jerks or their feeling that I didn't know what I was doing. I always felt that we had a good relationship. And when I disagreed, boy, I knew I had a job. (chuckle)
Now, I also feel that the Senate does a very good job when it takes on a broad area. For example, I think an example is after I got out, but this will illustrate it as the planning committees that tried to determine how the campus ought to be structured. Should a certain new administrative position be created or not created? Should we have a law school? I think that's an ideal kind of a thing for a Senate committee to take on, or take the long judgment and so on, get the wisdom and so on.

Where the Senate can't work is in dealing with day-to-day budgetary items. For example, something comes up quickly and we get some equipment money. The Senate can't sit in judgment about who ought to get that equipment money. The Senate doesn't have the background of information on a day-to-day ... Now, the Senate could, if you wanted to have full-time people who would stop everything that they were doing and devote it.

SM: (chuckle) Yes.

JM: So, you've got to have ... Let's put it: The more fast-acting, administrative decisions, which are the line authority right down from the Regents and so on, those have to be modulated by Senate advice, but you can't have the Senate making the decisions on those kinds of things. They're too quick. It's sort of like, in some sense, I was like the city manager, as Executive Vice Chancellor. You've got to have all
kinds of policy advice. But you have to take action. You have to make things happen. And you can't have that done by committee. You can't have a committee taking that action.

So, what I tried to do was always to find out what was the best way of working with the Senate, always seeking their advice on broad policy issues and not involving the Senate in the day-to-day operation of the campus, unless the Senate demanded to do so. And that was a general policy that I had, and I don't think that that's a bad one.

I also knew that on the campuses, for example, where the Committee and Budget was trying to do what the Vice Chancellor is doing, it didn't work very well. Santa Barbara had that model and Riverside had that model. And it became very politicized. People would run for office for that particular thing, so they could stick it to the Chancellor and so on. And you can't run a campus that way where your chief planning and allocating body is a government in exile. I mean, you can't have the Senate behaving as government in exile. That's my point on that.

SM: That's a good simile.

JM: So, do I love the Senate? Yes. I think there's one thing that I felt wistfully about, and there's nothing that can be done about this at all. But it's the case that while I was Vice Chancellor, I was also a member of the Senate and a faculty member, you understand.
SM: Yes.

JM: But the faculty loses sight of that. That is, once I became administrator, the opening assumption of the Senate is that I represent the administration and I don't understand faculty. And that's just you get labeled with that as soon as you become an administrator. And that bothered me. That always bothered me that I couldn't be seen as having a faculty perspective in making an administrative decision.

SM: Well, you should know that on your leaving that job, I remember hearing many people say, "Well, he's the only guy who wasn't against the faculty." (laughter)

JM: But, you see, when I was there, people always treated me as though I were an L. E. Cox or something. You know, just an administrator. You see what I'm saying? Because, after all, when you're administrator you're not a faculty member. And I know other people who have been Executive Vice Chancellor on this campus who have--because I've discussed it--have exactly the same feeling. Why is it the Senate frequently feels you're a natural enemy because you're administrator? You're a faculty member. You got the job because you grew out of the faculty and you represent that faculty and you're going to go back to the faculty.

SM: And you're going to go back to the faculty.

JM: But that's my only . . . I say that rather wistfully. I knew that nothing could be different. But if I could have changed
things, I would have wished that the faculty could have seen me more consistently as being an Academic Senate member, just happening to be temporarily in that administrative position. And that's just a fact of life. But that's one of my.

SM: Well, my history of UCI will straighten that out, will have it on the record.

JM: Okay.

SM: I'm on the record, yes. Now, the tenth question is really an interesting one to me. I watched you working with statewide people when they came down. You have that . . . What is it called? Dog and pony thing.

JM: Yes.

SM: With the Vice President coming down, his name I've forgotten. He told me I was carrying on an ad hominem attack on Salmon.

JM: Oh, you're talking about . . .

SM: And he went to Louisville as president.

JM: Yes.

SM: Well, anyhow . . .

JM: Donald Swain. Donald Swain.

SM: Yes, Donald Swain. Well, anyhow, he would come down and he would . . . Well, you really had everything well orchestrated. And we really put it to them, you know, our planning and this is what we think and all that. How did you manage to do that?
JM: Well, thank you. I did two things. You have to have your house in order here and then you have to have good relations with those people. So, let me tell you what I tried to do, in any case. I tried really to have our house in order, and the Academic Planning Council was key to that. Having Bill Parker as . . . I mean, I created the Assistant Vice Chancellor for Planning. That was his job. So, we had a full machinery there.

SM: He's brilliant. He really is brilliant.

JM: Yes. So, what I tried to do was not only orchestrate the planning machinery of the campus, but also make it clear to system-wide administration that we had such machinery, that we were what . . . we did speak with one tongue. We knew what we wanted to do. We had very clear numbers. And I got the Admissions Office to work with Planning and Budget Office. I got the Budget Director reporting to me so that I would know what all the numbers were. So that when they came down, I knew the facts. I mean, I didn't have to turn to somebody and say, "What's going on here?" So, I tried to be competent and to convey a sense of competence and have a sort of relaxed attitude. So that when they came down here, they would know, yes, this place is well-managed. They know what they're doing. In order to do that, it had to be that. So, I tried to make that happen. We talked about that earlier, although on different issues.
SM: You really did.

JM: Now, on the other hand, whenever I was invited to serve on a system-wide committee, I accepted. So that I was on the Health Planning Committee and, as a matter of fact, I was Chair of that for a number of years, Health Sciences Planning Committee of the University of California. So that I had lots of interactions with Swain and with the other Vice Chancellors, vis a vis that position. When it existed, I served on the Computer Policy Board. I was Chair of a physical planning committee that was set up under Bill Baker. So that whenever I was asked to play a role, I did play a role, and I did it because I thought that would enhance the visibility of UCI and put me more on a first name and working knowledge basis with the people who made decisions up there. And it just makes sense to do that, right? At least I thought it made sense to do that.

SM: Yes.

JM: Now, that exacted a pretty heavy price because that mean that I had to go to all of those committees. In some cases, serve on them and chair them for years. And that was a lot of work. But I think it paid off for the campus because everybody in system-wide knew that Irvine was a player. I don't think it reflected badly on the Irvine campus to know that Jim McGaugh was Chair of, let's say, a major committee of that kind.
Now, whether that's important in the long run, I don't know. But you're asking me how did I work effectively with them, I think that to be known and to develop a sense of confidence in the administration by knowing who the players are down here, it didn't hurt any. Let's put it that way. I don't think it did.

SM: Oh, no. I think it was positive.

JM: But I think that that is, if you like, that's greasing the wheels of the machinery. None of that would have worked if the system-wide administration did not see the numbers and see the organization, which convinced them then that we did know what we were doing down here. So, the other is paving the way to enable it to happen. And then once they pay attention to us, to say, "Boy, this is really . . . They know what they're doing down there." And from an administrative point of view, it's always a pleasure to give resources to an organization that gives you a sense that they know what they're doing.

SM: Yes, right. You see it right on, as they say. Now, question eleven. Drawing from your experience in administration, what changes do you think we should make? I mean, an example--you've already illustrated some--should be made in the administrative table. We're going to go to 26,000 probably by 2005. They're talking about that. And I've had several people on these interviews say well, now, we have . . . the machinery has been right for this number of students. And
it's right for this number of students. So, what's going to happen to the year 2005? You'll be around, Jim.

JM: Maybe.

SM: I may be dead. (chuckle)

JM: Some of the machinery is right, but has to be used in different ways. And I think that Jack is doing some of the right things here. He did a lot of right things, but here's one. I think the Deans historically here have not been treated as the major players that they ought to be. I think they were in the first two or three years, and then I don't think they have been since. But you were lucky as an early Dean because you were given broad authority and total responsibility, and so on.

SM: Oh, yes.

JM: That narrowed down in later years and more of that authority and responsibility was taken back by the Chancellor and by the Executive Vice Chancellor.

And Deans haven't had a lot of positions to play with. They haven't been able to do planning within the unit. I think that part of the answer here lies in the machinery of the Academic Senate. I believe that the Deans ultimately are going to have to be given authority to have committees like the Academic Personnel Committee or the Budget Committee within the school. That is, a lot of the decision has to be down at that level.
A Dean should be able to make an appointment of an Assistant Professor step one. A Dean should be able, with advice, to make the first merit increase to step two from step one. The Dean should not be allowed, without the campus-wide personnel committee, to make tenure decision, nor a professorial decision, nor above scale. So, I would say there are three cases in which the Senate should be heavily involved in the decision, and that's those key points—Associate Professor and above scale.

Many of the others, I think, could be made effectively at the level of the school and ought to be. You've got to decentralize in recognition of the larger scale of operation at that level. And also, if you want to have good Deans, you have to give them responsibility. And you can't have the Dean as a public school administrator in which the school superintendent makes all the decisions. We just can't do that. And I don't think that we allow the Deans to make as many decisions now as they ought to. That would be one way of keeping the same structure, but responding to the change requirements of the school.

I don't favor, for the future, ever having something like a Provost, which is between the Executive Vice Chancellor and the Deans. I favor having the Deans become more important, because we do have Deans at each of the major schools. And
the model of having a Provost for the Liberal Arts and a Provost for the other doesn't make any sense, for two reasons. One, is we only have one other that's of any size, and that's the Medical School. And that's got special problems. It's just got to be handled differently. And the other is, to a large extent, our professional schools on campus, the School of Engineering and the Graduate School of Management, operate pretty much like regular academic units. They don't operate as purely professional schools. I mean, we've had Deans of our School of Engineering who like those kids to have a good Liberal Arts type of . . . and they do take Humanities courses whenever they can, and so on.

SM: Yes.

JM: And I would hate to have them report over to a Provost for professional schools and to sort of treat them as though they were not really traditional academics. I don't favor that organization.

I don't have a prospectus for the future. I wish there was some wizardry that would come along and tell us how we ought to manage the interface of the Medical School with the hospital. That's the biggest nagging problem that we face, and there isn't a uniquely successful solution to that problem anywhere in the United States, because I looked into that. There just isn't a model for that. But that's a lingering problem.
As far as the organization of the rest of the campus, I think it's fine. I think the idea of making a Vice Chancellor out of the Graduate Dean was a good idea. Of course, I served on the committee that gave that advice, but it was a large committee.

SM: And what was the (inaudible).

JM: To change the Graduate Dean into a Vice Chancellor for Research.

SM: Oh, yes.

JM: I thought that was a good decision.

SM: Oh, yes. You and I talked about that. (inaudible)

JM: And I would say that that takes a load off of the Executive Vice Chancellor, to have that part of it worked with very effectively.

SM: Yes, Jim. (inaudible) my suggestion, for what it's worth, is pretty much the same as yours: Beef up the Deans' responsibilities. Get in an extra Assistant Dean maybe, but don't have a Provost.

JM: Right.

SM: Because it's one more table, desk, that the papers go on over and up to the Executive Vice Chancellor.

JM: It's just (inaudible). I like the way it is right now. And something had to be done to decrease the workload of the Executive Vice Chancellor or you're just going to kill people off in that position. And getting the Vice Chancellor for
Health Sciences is a kind of a solution for that, because more things will slide in that direction. But I'm not as sanguine about that decision as I am about the Vice Chancellor for Research. The answer is I don't have a prescription and I'm not very worried about it. I don't think it's a big deal because of our Dean structure. Because of our school structure here, I think we're okay.

SM: That's good. Jack Peltason said to me when he made me UCI Historian, he said, "Try to find out if there's anything off the record, important things, that may not appear in the documents or in the letters or there's no record of them. You can't find it and I can't find it, but you know what happened." Is there anything?

JM: Well, I think that . . . I don't know if I spoke about this when you interviewed me a long time ago, but I'm going to get back to the Department of Psychobiology, which I regard as a very important achievement, not only for this campus but internationally, because it was the first multi-disciplinary department of Neuroscience in the world. We had it here. And it's had a major impact throughout the world. People have modeled themselves after us, or at least looked over their shoulder at us. And one of the things that may not be written in history is how that department came to be. And that would be worth getting on the record.
Hinderaker played a role in it because he came from UCLA and consulted with Don Linsley about it. What would he do? And then Ed Steinhaus played a role in it, because he had his own view about how Psychology really ought to be in Biology and that was what he would like to have done. And then Ralph Gerard played a role in it because he wanted--after I was hired, even--you may know, he wanted to move it to Social Sciences. Are you aware of this little story?

SM: No.

JM: Well, what happened was that they were in ... within Social Sciences that they could recruit three major figures to Social Sciences, Kenneth Spence, Gardner Linsley ... 

SM: S-P-E-N-C-E?

JM: Yes, Spence. He was a ... Kenneth Spence, Gardner Linsley, who for years was the Director of the Center at Stanford, Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences. And Leon Festinger who was also a ... 

SM: How do you spell Festinger?

JM: F-E-S-T-I-N-G-E-R. Leon Festinger, who then went to Stanford. These people were sort of all in their prime at the time. They were all, I would say, a little past their prime at the time. But nonetheless, the highly visible name recognition would have put Irvine on the map instantly.

And I was told by Ed Steinhaus that I was to meet with Gardner Linsley in Palo Alto at Rickey's, which I did, and we
had a long lunch at Rickey's. And Linsley was to try to talk me into agreeing to move to Social Sciences and Psychobiology. And I was to agree to that. And in any case, I was to write a . . .

SM: I never heard this . . . this is true.

JM: And I had a report, which is probably somewhere around, I had to send a report to Ed Steinhaus on the meeting. And I wrote him a long letter about it. I told him I disagreed. That this was the one chance to do it right, to get Psychobiology correctly located. And there was a . . . I did not know the facts about this because--everything I told you now I was involved in. Then, now we come to the part that I was not involved in. There was a big shoot-out meeting to make the decision about where Psychobiology was going to be made located. And this probably took place in May of 1964, about there. Now, remember, I came down here for my interview in January and was told on January 16 that I was going to be hired. So, I sold my house and all of that, and I bought my house down here. This is May. I'm moving here June 8. And in May, I had a big decision. And Ralph Gerard voted in that meeting to move Psychobiology to Social Sciences. And Ed Steinhaus said, "Fine. You move it, and I'm packing up and going back to Berkeley."

SM: (laughter) Wonderful! Wonderful!
JM: And then the Chancellor made the decision. Now, if you haven't interviewed Hinderaker on this point, you should. Because Hinderaker is the only living person, aside from Dan. Maybe you should ask Dan about it. Ask him what was the history, whether he'd recall anything about it.

SM: I'm going to call Dan.

JM: It might not have been a very important thing for Dan.

SM: Excuse me.

JM: Oh. I think Hinderaker would probably remember that quite well.

SM: I'll see him.

JM: And that's an off the record thing but, boy, that would have changed the face of this place.

SM: (inaudible) Ed was so . . . Ed Steinhaus was a friend to most of us who were Deans, certainly myself. I asked him a lot of questions and I got a lot of good advice from him. Oh, well, what a loss.

JM: Well, that's a big, I suppose, not readily available. Although there must be a paper trail on that . . . .

SM: (inaudible) nobody's ever picked it up for me. And I did do a three-hour tape--I interviewed Ralph Gerard. He gave me a three-hour interview in 1971.

JM: I don't think he . . . I mean, once that decision was made, I don't think he cared much about it after it happened.

SM: Is that right?
JM: It was not a big deal to him. Of course, it was an enormous deal for me, because I wouldn't have come.

SM: Right. Oh, my gosh.

JM: I would have been the lesser for that decision, and that's the way it is.

SM: Well, that's interesting.

JM: I can't... I don't sit here burning with intrigue, quite frankly. There isn't an awful lot there.

SM: Well, that's not very important.

JM: There are... Well, let me just mention when... all the debacle over Social Ecology. No, not Social Ecology—Comparative Culture—was an interesting thing during my administration. But they are still angry with me and they're angry with everybody, but the facts of the case...

SM: Who is "they"?

JM: The Program in Comparative Culture.

SM: Oh, is that right?

JM: Oh, yes. They were awfully upset during that period of time.

SM: That's David Bruce and Jim Flink and (inaudible).

JM: Yes, all those people. Maybe that's not worth going into. It's not a big deal.

SM: It's not a big deal, but you'd be interested that the only rather sad interview I've had, the only one, was with Dave Bruce. And his (inaudible), you know, is his (inaudible) Comparative Culture, and their future.
JM: Well, they haven't a good future.

SM: Now, as you reflect on your work, what suggestions do you have for the Historian of UCI, except to tell it as it is?

JM: Well, I think that the Historian, which is you, should try to find angles of incidents, turning points, places where the campus might have gone in one direction as another direction, because that's what has shaped the character of this place. And also, I think I would focus on key players, because I do not believe that personalities are indifferent. I don't believe that personalities make the institutions. Don't misunderstand. I don't have a "big man" theory of history. But I have a "moderate man" theory of history. That people, you know, you can't deny that Napoleon made a difference, for example.

SM: And particularly, Jim, in a new institution.

JM: Yes.

SM: The Deans had a lot of responsibility. The Chairs had a lot.

JM: So, I think that there are key things that happened that made this institution. I would certainly think that the appointment of Dan Aldrich for Orange County was a very important decision. And it would not have worked if the Chancellor at Santa Cruz had been the Chancellor here. (inaudible) replaced, that would have been disaster, just because of his style and so on. And Dan has the appearance and the character and the voice and the values and so on,
which made a moderately liberal Republican acceptable to right-wing fascist Orange County. So, that was an important thing to remember about this place.

I think that the accident of Hinderaker's leaving, with Jack arriving to be Dean of the college and then getting elevated to the position of Vice Chancellor and leaving that Dean of the college position empty, was one of the most important things that ever happened to this campus.

SM: Oh, no question.

JM: Because what that did was to give us a school structure rather than a Liberal Arts structure, and we are a different institution as a consequence of that. So, from a purely structural point of view, that almost accidental occurrence has as much to do with the shape of us as anything else that ever happened. So, I would emphasize that. That's a . . . I'd call that an (inaudible) incidence, a turning point.

SM: Yes.

JM: I think that there was extraordinarily either brilliant thinking or good luck, with respect to the initial collection of Deans on the campus. Look back on it and say, "Who have the Deans been since?" And when is this going to be published?

SM: Oh, I won't write this until a year and a half from now. And I won't get it sent to a publisher for two and half years from now.
JM: Okay. Well, I would just say that on average, that the initial collection of Deans appeared to me to be a specially good group of people. And let me just put it at that. And I think that was a very fortunate thing. And I also think that some of the Department Chairs also were extraordinarily good, if you look at who they were and how well they have fared.

SM: Oh, yes.

JM: They were young kids then, and how well they've done, (inaudible).

SM: And Hazard Adams. (inaudible)

JM: Hazard and Sherry Rowland, for example.

SM: (inaudible)

JM: Good grief! You could do a hell of a lot worse than that. And I think . . .

SM: Abe Melden.

JM: (inaudible) I think that those were very good things. I think the Medical Schools coming here at the time that it came was a disaster for us. I think that also that we did not make a strong enough case visibly early on that we were a major research university, a contender. And we lived much too long in the shadow of UC San Diego, for example. As UC San Diego was the really good place, and then there were the other new places. And I don't think we were as aggressive on that point. And I don't think we recognized the importance of
that, sufficiently. We sort of felt that there was just a destiny of UCI to become great or to become good at whatever it was. It would take care of itself. And that was not enough. And I think we lost a lot of the initiative... we lost to San Diego because it started off with its Nobel Prize winners and Academy winners. There's a (inaudible) and it got really a jump on us, in terms of being seen as a quality place. They had an easier time of recruiting than we did, as a consequence of that.

SM: Yes.

JM: And I think that was a major, if you like, negative impact on our ability to get started. I think that the early days of Social Sciences did not reflect well on us. That was a big negative. I think we've largely recovered from that now.

SM: Oh, yes.

JM: And it has done quite well. But that was a long, dry period. Well, I guess my advice is to look for these key major influences that have helped us. Some of the people, some of the events, some of the things that we did do, some of the accidents. And I'd say the accident of Peltason becoming Vice Chancellor and leaving us, I think that was the biggest administrative thing that ever happened here. Almost an accident that it put the power and the driving force in the organization within the school structure, elevated the significance of Deans, and so on. And that gave us a
different complexion from our counterpart institutions (inaudible).

SM: Yes. The interesting thing, Jim, about a College of Arts and Sciences is that each of them have their own committees. There's where you meet people from (inaudible). The only place we meet them is in the Academic Senate and the Senate committees. That's where I meet Psychologists and Psychobiologists and so on.

JM: Yes, yes. Well, you pay for it. I mean, I'm not . . . One can argue there's not much of a good. Maybe we should have had that school structure, that type of structure. In place of that, we had the school structure. I think it has made within the schools a stronger operation as a consequence of that.

SM: Oh, I agree with you. And I voted for . . . I wanted to see it separate schools. And I had talked to Clark Kerr, I remember, about it. And Clark Kerr even came by and gave us a pitch in the Senate, if you recall, at the end of the first year. And it wasn't too far away from his being fired. But he said . . . He came around in the fall, I think. Maybe it was the spring. But I can see (inaudible) running the meeting and I can see Clark Kerr saying, "Now, you really ought to take organized colleges or schools." I think he called them colleges.

JM: Yes.
SM: Now, the last question, Jim, is what was your . . . What would you do if you had to do it over?

JM: Well, this is going to sound flippant and I don't mean it this way. I probably would not have stayed in the job as long, if I had to do it over, because I . . .

SM: The job of Executive Vice Chancellor?

JM: Yes, or Vice Chancellor totally, because I was in there eight years. And I believe that's probably about a five or six-year job. That is, for anybody, because that's not a permanent job. A Vice Chancellor is a Vice Chancellor job. And I think that toward the end of it, I was probably a little bit too worn out, maybe a little too acidic. You just get tired of seeing some of the same problems over and over again.

SM: Oh, yes.

JM: And seeing the ones that can't be solved, and so on. But the joy, the real joy had gone out after about five years, where you're moving and shaking and so on. So, I think that I probably should have left about two years earlier. Just looking back on it, it would have made more sense. So, that's one thing I'd do differently.

Secondly, I think that I was too enamored of the idea that academic structural changes were solutions. And maybe that was the legacy of Hazard Adams, because I did have to deal with the problem of how things were going to be organized, and what to do with Social Ecology, and what to do
with Computer Sciences, and what to do with the Graduate School of Administration, and what to do with Engineering, and so on, because they were all undersized and we weren't growing. And I looked to organizational solutions for those things. Remember, Hazard tried to reorganize the campus with Comparative Culture put here and everything, and that blew up in his face. And so, I felt that there was a better way of doing that, and I'd take that on, and I did some reorganization. But in retrospect, it wasn't very clever or very useful. I don't think that big structural reorganizations have the impact. They're not the therapy that I imagined as a child that they were. As I look back on that, I probably spent entirely too much time wondering about what to do with Engineering, and what to do with this, and where to put that, and so on. And I think that if I were in that job now—which I would never do again. That part of my life is finished.

But were I in it, I would have had a much more relaxed attitude about those kinds of reporting relationships and so on. Just get good people and make them do a good job and not worry too much about it. Now, on the other hand, in starting a university, I'd want to make sure that we did as good a job as we possibly could and make the organization correct. Notice the inconsistency. I said the (inaudible) that their not getting a Dean of a College of Arts, Letters, and Sciences
was a very good thing to have happened. Once that happened, we set in motion schools. Now, it would be equally bad to try to put back in a Dean of College of Arts, Letters, and Sciences on top of that, because you think it would make sense to do. But it would be a bad idea.

SM: It would make us Divisions again.

JM: Oh, it would be a bad idea. So, that's something that I think I probably wasted a lot of campus time on and my own time, and it didn't really end up as amounting to what I thought it was amounting to. Maybe politically it was good because it gave the campus a sense of, you know, the boss taking charge here and making things happen.

SM: Yes. I really like that.

JM: Yes, it may be politically important, but I don't think that it had any long range significance. Most of those problems still linger. I didn't solve them. I didn't solve the problem of Comparative Culture. It's still here, you know. I didn't solve the problem of the Graduate School of Management. That didn't get solved, it isn't getting solved, and so it's much larger. You need to have a big one. The School of Engineering problem isn't going to be solved by administrative reorganization. It just needs to be about five times the size it was in order to be a School of Engineering. I mean, those are the solutions to those.

SM: Yes.
JM: Yes, I spent too much time on that. I probably spent too much time on the hospital. But it was my responsibility. I had the line authority. And it's not like it is right now. (inaudible) through me. But I did kind of let it (inaudible) and it just . . . It occupied my calendar most of the time. And I think I would . . . Age does something to you. You wouldn't know this, but I do. I find that I'm much more mellow than I was even ten years ago. I look at a problem and I think . . .

SM: I think I am.

JM: You know, I realize that there are some things that are never going to be corrected. The problems of the Israelis and the Arabs will be here centuries yet to come.

SM: Yes.

JM: I tell a story. I've told this story many, many times about a Chinese Ph.D. student of mine. He's now a very successful faculty member in Taipei who, when he was here, was at a party. He was not very social and he was off in a corner watching TV while we were having a regular party. And on the TV was the movie "MacArthur." And just flippantly I said, "Hey, Yang," I said, "who won World War II?" And he looked up at me with a very solemn face and he said, "Oh, Dr. McGaugh," he said, "it's much too early to tell."

SM: (laughter)
JM: He said that. I mean, that's the attitude I think that I'm increasingly adopting about all of these things. Where we think we're having a major impact and there are big changes and look what we did and look at this, and I solved that problem. Well, I look back on the structural changes that I induced in the academic machinery here. I don't think that I solved any single problem with any one of those decisions. I think the problems got solved by . . . To the extent the problems were solved is by setting up the right advisory groups, by appointing the right people. I mean, those are where you have the long-term impact.

SM: Well, when you get to my age--I'll be seventy-three three weeks from now--I just don't get excited.

JM: Yes, now, I'm going to be fifty-eight, and I find that I get less agitated and I . . . You know, revolutions are not made by fifty-eight-year-old men. You know, revolutions are made by nineteen, twenty, twenty-five, thirty, because they believe that substantial change can be made with a little effort. And I don't believe that. I don't believe that.

SM: (chuckle) Oh, gee.

JM: I think you make substantial changes with a lot of effort and with even a greater amount of luck. That's all. And there are lots of things you can make changes don't have any great import. So, you asked me . . . The question is, what would I do differently? I can't answer the question, really,
because it's a reflection of age and maturity and changes and so on. I certainly would be more relaxed about it. I would have much more feeling. I'd do a better job of sorting the little problems and the big problems and keeping them apart. And I think I tended to, more often than not, treat them with the same degree of affect and attention. And maybe that's good. Maybe that's why . . . I mean, you look around and our Vice Chancellors have generally been young people. And I think that there is probably a reason for that. But they will put energy into it. I mean, we'll take these little tiny problems and behave as though they're a really important problem and march in there and try to do something about it. Maybe you need that kind of energy.]

SM: Right.

JM: And maybe you need an old-timer as a Chancellor who will let the kids play. (laughter)

SM: Well, Jim, this has been a wonderful interview and I thank you very much.

END OF INTERVIEW