Put on board: (a) list of equivalents below in sec. 2; E. Husserl, J-P Sartre, R. Carnap (with dates)

Heidegger's story:

1. Peasant kid with complicated relation to Catholicism, brief period as a Jesuit novice. 
   Moved under shadow of leading philosopher of the day, E.H., who was both an anti-historicist and a Jew. A superprofessional superPlatonist who prized apodicity above all—a Plato redivivus.

2. First big book 1927: an essay in "phenomenological ontology", a term he would come to despise. In the '40's he wrote that this book was not yet seinsgeschichtlich gedacht. From 1935 onwards what he wrote was the story sketched at p. 433—the story of how Plato to Nietzsche is a single story of Platonism turning against itself, logic biting its own tail, inverting itself as Marx inverted Hegel, etc.

   Quote p. 164 in Nietzsche, vol. 4 on Nietzsche and Platonism, and say that
   technical interpretation of thinking=representational thinking=propositional thinking=metaphysics=humanism=that fated to end in nihilism=Platonism=anti-historicism=refusal to accept finitude=need to take control=need to have either a religious creed or a philosophical system

3. The first book founded "existentialism"—a lot of stuff about anxiety, death, authenticity, resoluteness, etc. The basic idea behind these portions of the book was that we are only truly human—only truly Da-sein—when we stand out from the crowd, do not do what "one" does, etc.

   For a sample, look at pp. 101-104, a lecture written two years after B&T.

4. B&T owed a lot to N and to SK, and was sort of N put in scholastic, Husserlian, professorial, terms. It had a tremendous success, but in retrospect it pales beside the later "history of being" which "overcomes" N.

5. Even if it weren't for the Nazis, he would probably have shifted over from phen. ont. to History of Being, for there were tensions within the historicism of the end of B&T and the earlier existentialist stuff which would have driven him.

   But people say, probably rightly, that the turn from stuff about das Volk in B&T to the abandonment of nationalism and large-scale movements in the later work had a lot to do with the Nazi experience.

6. Details of Nazi stuff: 1929 letter; dismissal of the Jews and MH's party membership; his wife; his silence; the Farias controversy.

7. Reactions to his work: Husserl's on B&T (you can't serve both
me and Nietzsche), Carnap's to "Nichts nichtet". Sartre's "Existentialism is a Humanism"--a basically Marxist document (Sartre being the person who said, even after Stalin's death, that anti-communists were automatically scum--but never got the flak for it that MH got for his Naziism).

8. Sartre: existence precedes essence: choice; make yourself; don't go with the flow; realize that you are not what you have been--nor anything else save what you choose. "Man is a futile passion"; "the most existentialist couple". [Quotes]
More MH books coming into Newcomb early next week! Any other books I should be sure to reorder?

Remember Thurs. disc. now at 2:00 instead of 4:00, so O.H. now 3:00-4:00 instead of 2:30-4:00.

Heidegger for Sept. 29:

0. Recap of Monday: thugs and philosophy don't have much to do with each other, nor do N and MH and Hitler. Good philosophy not an antidote against totalitarian thugs or bad philosophy a help to them. Lenin was not a philosopher, just a thug who like to play at philosophy. Hitler got nothing from N he wouldn't have had elsewhere. Platonism or Logical Postivism do nothing to help prevent the rise of the bad guys.

Questions about MH and Nazis, a topic to which I shan't recur?


2. Quotes from LH, p. 232, on why MH doesn't like this: the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement". MH is a reformed power-freak, somebody who went in for a lot of talk about resoluteness and readiness and such, and got over it.

3. Sartre and Nietzsche both too unpoetic, too willful, too active; they think of decision, resoluteness, etc. as more important than patient listening, passive willingness to open up to the possibility of a new song. The peasant and the poet are linked for MH, against the warrior and the scientist, who are both power-freaks and/or the sort of sublimated power-freak we call a "control-freak".

Calvin's dad and control-freaks. But was aber bleibet...

4. Quote "We are too late for the gods..." "...one star".

5. Start exegesis of "The End..." by talking about power-freakery, control, poetry as the opposite of control-freakery

Quote Plato, pp. 407-8, and say that H is objecting that reason, logic, philosophy, etc. are only made possible by poetry.

Poetry creates the world in which these things are possible. It sets up the board on which the philosophers then make moves.

Quote Origin, p. 168 on temple, with p. 166 on Bamberg cathedral after the god has fled. (Pan o megas tethneke--quoted by N as what happened when Socrates came along. He deserted Dionysus, so Appolo deserted him, as with Euripides.)

Quote Origin, p. 170 on "world": the world is not a collection of objects.

For H, "the Thinker" is more like a poet than like a scientist--he
is the sort of thinker who says something new and revolutionary and hard to argue about, the kind who counts as what Bloom calls a "strong poet", a mighty maker.

Quote Origin, p. 197-9 on poetry and poesy. The essence of art is poetry--and also the essence of language.

6. Talk about the Greeks, the Jews, the Chinese, the Newtonians, the Marxist, the Romantics, the Augustinians, as clearings created by words of Being

7. No Dasein, No Language, No Being: Only where Dasein is, is there Being. (Pun, same as on p. 238: explain "es gibt", "il y a", etc.) The line at p. 238 "The self-giving into the open, along with the open region itself, is Being itself." This is as much of a definition of "Being" as you are going to get out of MH.

God and Being are different: god, in the orthodox tradition is a big powerful causal agent. Being is absolutely helpless; it needs us as much as we need it; if there is a religious equivalent it is SK's God who needs to be loved, the God who became a servant out of love.

Being isn't a person, but if it were it would be more like a person in need of love than it's like an Omnipotent Creator, more like Jesus than like God the Father.

Third Heidegger lecture: Oct. 4, 1993

0. By now it's clear that the authors we're reading in this course are telling stories, or creating poems by creating jargons, rather than arguing. So don't worry if you can't find a thread running through their essays. Just read to get the mood and moral, and then read over again to see how the various bits of jargon and the various slogans fit together.

In B&T he says "the ultimate business of philosophy [this was before he started distinguishing philosophizing from Thinking] is to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding [=common sense] from leveling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in the end as a source of pseudo-problems."

Think of this as coalescing philosophy and literary criticism, in that the task of the literary critic (as of the actor, or the reciter of poetry) is to prevent Homer, Shakespeare, etc. from being banalized by constant quotation or by scholarship.

1. Existence, Being, beings, and ek-stasy/ek-sistence. Dasein isn't one more existent, one more occupier of space and time, because he stands outside himself--his ability to be part of a poem makes him different from pre-poetic anthropoids. P. 254: "In ek-sistence the region of homo animalis, of metaphysics, is abandoned. The dominance
of that region is the...basis...for biologism...and pragmatism”.

To say that the region of homo animalis is the region of metaphysics is to say that the metapsychic man--and the obvious way to define him is as a certain kind of animal. But it is also to suggest that man remains merely animal as long as he dwells in "the oblivion of Being" which is metaphysics.

It is also to suggest that pragmatists, who take their cue from Darwin, are animals in being unable to dwell poetically.

You ek-sist if, as authentic Dasein, you dwell poetically, rather than pragmatically. See p. 245: "In his essential unfolding within the history of Being, man is the being whose Being as ek-sistence consists in his dwelling in the nearness of Being. Man is the neighbor of Being."

2. The difference between Awe and Gratitude. God (like the Form of the Good) is one more being, insofar as he causes and has power--but he is awesome, because he has such a lot of power. Anything which can be thought of in terms of causal relationships is just a being. Being is not a being; not just because it's not a person, but more specifically because He has no power. See p. 240, top: only so long as Dasein is, is there [gibt es] Being...The sentence does not say that Being is the product of man.

Es gibt=il y a=there is=our relation to Being can only be one of gratitude, but not awe. Awe is an appropriate attitude to power, but gratitude and love are appropriate attitudes toward the powerless but holy.

Tillich tried to get this across by saying "Being is the object of ultimate concern", and "everybody (who is authentic Dasein) has some symbol of ultimate concern"--only pragmatists and animals don't.

Tillich's version can be supplemented by "language is the language of Being, as the clouds are the clouds of the sky". What is the sky? An illusion? A blue dome? [Not always--sometimes a grey threat. What is our emotional relation to the sky? Not awe, exactly. But, sometimes, gratitude--as when we are "glad to be alive; glad to be under the sky instead of under the earth".

P. 240 again: Being is essentially broader than all beings, because it is the clearing itself--that wherein we live and move and have our (authentic) being.

3. Nietzsche: p. 241: he was "the last to experience this homelessness". From within metaphysics he was unable to find any other way out than a reversal of metaphysics. But that is the height of futility."

N was the last because he was the Last Metaphysical Thinker, everybody since has just been a pragmatist. "Pragmatism as the American attempt to conceive of Americanism still remains beneath
the level of metaphysics".

4. Pragmatism and truth-as-correctness and Values: pragmatism says that beliefs are tools which human beings use to get what they want. But this suggests that they know what they want before a poet has told them what they want.

   Correctness = the pragmatic view that a good belief is one which is a good tool--the right tool for the purpose, the correct tool for the occasion.

   Truth=what poetry provides, the purposes which we have.

   Values=the idea that we create our purposes, instead of getting them from the poets.

   P. 251: "thinking in values is the greatest blasphemy imaginable against Being." Only a Darwinian pragmatist would think in terms of values.
1. The def. of "phil." on p. 374 as "representational thinking which gives reasons" is clarified by going on to "principle" and "presence".

2. "Principle" is that which stands behind the appearances and makes them possible and which we need to "bring to presence" in a way in which the unstable appearances cannot be "brought to presence". "Stand still and look me in the eye!" or "Stand still and let me look at you." are the slogans of "representational thinking that gives reasons."

3. "Giving reasons" means "leading back to the obvious--leading back to the certain and unquestionable, leading back to what is so clearly present that nobody can deny it. The call for "clear and distinct Ideas" "the evidence of the senses" "the clear still voice of conscience", "the certainty of sound common sense", "the clear lesson of history" etc. are so many attempts to find an ultimate framework for deliberation.

4. Notice the visual metaphors which dominate here, and which are, H thinks, Plato's principal legacy to us.

5. What Plato neglected, and what all questers for certainty neglect, is that certainty is relative to language-games, just as "clarity" is just "familiarity". What is expected and anticipated in outline can be "clearly seen". What isn't cannot be. (Consider Bruner's psychological tests with red clubs and black hearts.)

6. The last sentence of the first paragraph on p. 374 gives you Descartes's God, Kant's transc. ego, Hegel's Abs. Spirit and Marx's economics as examples of "metaphysical thinking which grounds the ground for being". It "grounds the ground" of cooking up a vocabulary, building a new house for being, in which a new ground becomes the "obvious" sort of thing to look for.

7. So, as he says in the second paragraph "Metaphysical thinking, starting from what is present, represents it in its presence and thus exhibits it as grounded by its ground". Then it can say that it has "given an account" (logon didonai) of things, shown that the real is the rational, and the rational the real. If it can't be rationally accounted for" it can be dismissed as "mere appearance."

8. The third paragraph asks: so what is meant by the end of phil.? What would it be like not to think that the rational was the real, and the confusing and unclear the apparent? What it would be like for "the true world" to become a fable? All H tells you here is that it is not a matter of finding out "which is the best metaphysics", as if you could find one big "house of being" within which all of the language-games of all the previous philosophers could be "made present" and inspecting neutrally. That would be a "metaphysics of metaphysics" and would just be "one more metaphysics."
9. The fourth and fifth paragraphs (on p. 375) explain that "the end of philosophy" means "the completion of metaphysics"—that is, the triumph of pragmatism, the decision that all languages are simply means to ends—the least common denominator of N and Marx and Dewey.

10. Another way to put this is given in the sixth paragraph (bottom of p. 375): "the development of the (special, including the social) sciences is their separation from philosophy and the establishment of their independence. This process belongs to the completion of philosophy."

11. On p. 376, the seventh and eighth paragraphs say that "philosophy turns into the empirical science of man"—no big general principles about man, but simply cybernetics, the way to control and predict people (not just workers, but artists, philosophers, etc.—"the conditions of intellectual production")."

12. The rest of pp. 376-7 summarize "The Question Concerning Technology" and say that pragmatism=technology is not just the way things happen to have gone, but they culmination and completion of the way they have been going since Plato (the point I tried to make in my lightning history of philosophy last time.)

13. The last two paragraphs of Section I (bottom of p. 377 and top of p. 378) just suggest that maybe there is still something to Think about.

*************

14. Starting the order of paragraphs over again, the first paragraph asks "What can thought be if it is neither metaphysics nor science?" What can it be if it is non-pragmatic and does not look for grounds, for a reality behind an appearance?

15. In the fifth paragraph we find that we can still think "the historicity of that which grants a possible history to philosophy". That is, we can still think about the fact that the Platonism-pragmatism of the West is just one history, one temporal contingency, one "gift of Being."

16. From the bottom of p. 379 to the middle of p. 383 we get an excursus on Hegel, Husserl and transcendental subjectivity which just says that both H's followed Descartes in thinking that "'With Descartes' ego cogito, philosophy steps on firm ground for the first time, where it can be at home". (p. 380) For now philosophy does not have to suffer from skepticism about the relation between Subject and Object, but can just content itself with pulling out of the Subject what was contained therein.

17. As H says on p. 382, this is a thesis of "the primacy of
method"—or, one might better say, of the primacy of certainty. The answer to the question "What should philosophy think about?" becomes "Whatever there is least risk of error about?" This is the kind of "cowardice" which N diagnosed in Socrates.

18. H thinks of himself as brave because he eschews "principles" and "grounds" and "certainties" and attempts to answer the question "how do you know?" "what's your definition?" "what's your argument?"

19. Finally, at the bottom of p. 383 and p. 384 we get the upshot of everything that has gone before: the contrast between the "brightness" of the "clear" daylight which Hegel found in Descartes and which Husserl found in Wesenschau and the "openness" which is the prerequisite of lighting-up. I interpret the crucial claim that "light presupposes openness" on p. 384 as the claim that "clarity" presupposes a language-game.

20. To think about "opening" would be cease to look for "presence" and "ground" and to agree with Goethe that we should "look for nothing behind phenomena; they are themselves what is to be learned." (p. 385) That is, there is nothing behind the phenomena save their names, and there is nothing to be learned from the names, save that there once was a Naming.

21. At p. 385 we finally are told what the "task of thinking is. It is to question whether the "free" (that is, ungrounded, contingent, temporal) opening (created by a Naming) is not what philosophy was looking for (in the wrong direction), viz., "the place which gathers and protects everything." To realize that this was the case would be to be authentic Dasein at last.

22. At p. 386 we get the explicit contrast between openness and presence, and the claim that philosophy (i.e., Platonism) "knows nothing of the opening." Philosophy's quarrel with poetry is precisely that it thinks that "the opening" is "unclear" and "confusing" and "metaphorical" and "not really serious."

23. At p. 387 we identify the opening with aletheia, with the aim of philosophy qua truth, an aim which it has confused with "correctness," as we go on to find out at pp. 388-390. We can no longer translate "aletheia" as "truth" because that word has been used, by the metaphysical tradition, to mean adequatio, orthotes, and (especially) certitudo. That old debbil certitudo has made opening invisible to us.

24. The last two pages ask "is this irrationalism?" The right answer is "sure", if by "irrationalism" you mean argument, definition, clarity and the quest for certainty. But (p. 391) remember that it was just the latter that led us to "the frenzy of rationalism" to "cybernetics" to "man as inventory or raw material" to the rape of the planet, etc.
25. Last word (p. 392): All this (and, more generally, all of the invention of the latest language-game, Heideggerese) was supposed to help you with "the task of thinking: the surrender of previous thinking to the determination of the matter for thinking"—the honorable surrender of philosophy to poetry.
Poetry lets beings be in both senses:

(1) it brings them to light, as the temple brings the landscape of Greece to light, as the Rotunda brings the idea of scholarship and science to light, as Shakespeare and Wordsworth brought daffodils to light;

(2) it doesn't try to use them, doesn't try to relate them to antecedent human needs, doesn't envelop them in a web of relationships.

LH, p. 251: "thinking in values is the greatest blasphemy imaginable against Being" = thinking pragmatically about the temple or the oracle or the university or the daffodils (what values do they exemplify? = how can I use them = how should they be placed in my preference ranking = where do they stand in a causal sequence)

Nietzsche torn between poetry and power, between Sophocles and Darwin: half the time he is saying the same sorts of things as Heidegger says against Socrates, looking at science through the optic of art; the other half of the time he is looking at art and poetry through the optic of life--that is, in a Darwinian, heroic, struggle for existence, way.

Go on to "End of Philosophy":

1. Whole first paragraph on p. 432.
2. 433 on Platonism
3. 434 on cybernetics
4. 435 end of philosophy = triumph of technology = triiumph of pragmatism = triumph of values = the age in which it does not occur to anyone to let a being be = the age in which nobody can any longer dwell poetically
5. 436 on "the historicity of that which grants a possible history to philosophy" (Is there philosophy in Asia?)
6. 443 Philosophy [=Platonism] knows nothing of the clearing; that is, philosophy knows nothing of language, except as a device for cooperative projects of taking control (Descartes doubted everything save the Latin and French languages)
7. Aletheia and correctness: no language, no chance for correctness.
Go on to "Question Concerning Technology":

1. Relate p. 326 (erecting a statue in the temple precinct" and damming the Rhine different but related--both poems: technology is itself a poem) to p. 433 (each epoch of philosophy has its own necessity).

   The trouble here is that he also keeps saying "the wasteland spreads". So which is it? Is the modern world a disaster or Being's new poem?

   H thinks to solve the problem by saying: it's only a disaster if we don't live in it poetically, seeing it as one more word of Being.

   It's not clear that this does solve the problem.

2. P. 333: the threat is not the atomic bomb and the ozone layer but the increasing difficulty of dwelling poetically in an age in which we have so much success as a result of not letting beings be

3. P. 337: Where there is danger, grows the saving power.