The notion of textual allegory, as it derives from the *Social Contract*, provides the generalizing principle which makes it possible to consider theotropic or ethical allegories as particularized versions of this generative model and thus to break down the significance of such thematic distinctions. It also implies that the terminology of generality, particularity and generative power has a degree of referential undecidability which should exclude any simplified metaphorical use of these terms, while anticipating the failure to achieve such vigilance, or such immunity to rhetorical seduction. If, for example, we consider the introduction of a theological dimension into the political context of the *Social Contract* as the thematization of a structure that cannot be separated from the textuality of any text, (the inherent necessity, for any operative language to postulate transendental signification), then the "inclusion" of a deconstructed version of the *Profession de Foi* within the context of the *Social Contract* is predictable, since both works can be considered as the same political allegory, the first on a figural, the second on a textual level. The *Profession de Foi* is the text whose textuality the *Social Contract* deconstructs. This insertion of the *Profession* into the *Contract* becomes manifest in the chapter "De la Religion Civil" which was presumably composed as an extension of the earlier chapter on the Legislator(1), and reads like a translation of the *Profession de Foi* into the language of Nietzsche's *Antichrist*. The question raised about referential efficacy of the *Profession de Foi* and of religious texts in general and of religious texts in general thus have to be subsumed under the more systematic, but also more troublesome, relationship between the language of statement and the language of action, between grammar and figure, as it becomes articulated in a textual allegory.
Within the limits of this study, there is no need to work this out in detail.

The reading of Rousseau in terms of rhetorical theory can be concluded at this point, for it is doubtful that it could yield further insight into the constitution and the function of figural models. This does not mean that the notion of textural allegory, despite its wide "generalizing" scope, can be considered as the horizon of all rhetorical systems, as a paradigm or a figure limite that closes off the rhetorical domain. From a curious note to the garden letter of Julie (LV, p483), we know that Rousseau considers any horizon as confining, whereas the illusion of seclusion allows for imaginative expansion. (1) Whenever we seem to be closing off the rhetorical field, we, in fact, open up a new space of rhetorical juxtapositions and metafigural chains.

For the textural allegory is itself a polymorphous structure from which a new strand of rhetorical models can be derived. The reading of the Social Contract showed that the presumed theory turns out to be in fact a narrative. But the plot of the Social Contract is only one of the various stories that the textual allegory is empowered to tell, and the difference in the plot-structure can be symptomatic of a difference in the structure of the rhetorical mode. (2) Rousseau's own work provides us with at least one instance of another plot-structure that unfolds a figural tangle similar to that of the Social Contract. Whereas the Social Contract states the law of the text with considerable precision but fails to heed the warning that this text spells out with regard to performative its operative mode, one can imagine a different plot, in which the warning is being obeyed, but at the cost of the constative, theoretical clarity. The necessary loss of the one at the benefit of the other is built within the system and escapes intentional control. We saw, for example, that the Social Contract could not help but promise precisely
because it was capable of formulating its own textural structure so accurately. In the same way, a textural allegory that refuses the promise it implies cannot help but obscure the insight into the structural law of its own textuality. In Rousseau's work, the best example for this pattern is the novel La Nouvelle Heloise taken as a whole, (though without the Second Preface which, within this perspective, is alien to the model we are trying to describe).

That the complete Nouvelle Heloise is a textual allegory like the Social Contract and no longer like the Profession de Foi, a thematized allegory susceptible to metaphorical deconstruction, is evident from the explicit passage, at the end of Part III, from a contractual, political plot. Julie's marriage, a distinctly legal action, very clearly marks this articulation, of which the equivalent would be the passage, in the pre-text of the Social Contract from Diderot's natural to Rousseau's contractual law. La Nouvelle Heloise thus acquires a genuinely theoretical dimension, unlike its Preface or the Profession de Foi which function politically on the level of praxis only and are unable to account for their own efficacy. Unlike the Social Contract, however, La Nouvelle Heloise rigorously abstains from holding out promises of any kind although it had reached a power of theoretical generalization that would enable it to do so. The deconstructive rigor of the first half, culminating in letter 18 of part III, goes beyond the mere relapse into metaphorical diction that was pointed out earlier. The structure of this relapse becomes more complex than the description we gave of it, (which remains restricted to the relationship between Julie, Saint Preux and a divine, transcendental power) which left out of consideration the area of signification associated with Wolmar and Clarens. Clarens cannot be considered simply as another relapse into the rhetorical
system that governs the relationship between Julie and Saint Preux, and the prominent place it occupies in books IV and V is bound to have some bearing on the significance of the Julie-Saint-Preux dialogue in the concluding section of the novel. As the product of a contractual and legal action, no longer inspired by individual passions, it has a general significance that would give it the exemplary function of a legal and political text. The political, legal and economic institutions that it describes have a more than anecdotal significance and are not just a backdrop to the story of personal involvement. The renunciation of what the somewhat later fragment "Du Bonheur Public" (1762?) will call "bonheur des individus" III (510) in favor of a more collective form of well-being must be taken seriously unless one wishes to reduce the second part of La Nouvelle Heloïse to a lengthy banality. Rousseau's attempt to include the transition from a private to a public affectivity into one single text, and not to treat them as the specular image of each other (as even Flaubert can be said to be doing in the Sentimental Education), can be seen as the textual counterpart of what, on the level of the plot, is treated as the story of a renunciation. What is being given up by the marriage to Walmar is precisely the possibility of a metaphorical totalization that unites private to public well-being, the same illusion that is being de-constructed in "Du Bonheur Public". The 1762 fragment is fully anticipated by the 4 or 5 year earlier Nouvelle Heloïse. Once this step is taken, nothing would have prevented Rousseau from making the description of Clarens as rigorous, systematic and, hence, as promissory of political order as the Social Contract was (in note) to be a couple of years later (I leave it to anyone's imagination to conjecture what the plot of such a novel would have been; it could hardly have been more awkward and far-fetched than what now makes up the dramatic"action" of the second half of the Nouvelle Heloïse, the pre-ender
the pre-determined plot structure. Yet, he chose not to do so. That Clarens, despite its theoretical consistency, is not the political model of the state, be Rome, Lacedaemonia, the Judaic diaspora, or the theoretical model outlined in the Social Contract, is clear, among other things from the continued presence of erotic patterns. Erotic love is the figure of a stage of metaphorical mystification that has been explicitly and definitively deconstructed at least from the end of Book III on.

The same letter, as we saw earlier, also prefigures Julie's unavoidable relapse into the same pattern of error that she denounces with great clarity and eloquence, but it nevertheless allows for the transition to the political acumen of the novel's second half. Whereas a part of Julie's relapses into a "natural" pattern of erotic gratification and desire that could never be a valid model for political order, another part of her is capable of a degree of "generalization that allows for the production of a systematic theoretical discourse. The relationship between these two parts of "Julie" remains all the enigmatic since the two areas are not separated from each other but appear in a mixed form.

The concluding exchange of letters between Julie and Saint Preux illustrate the extent of the relapse. Whereas the education of St. Preux has progressed to the point where the identification with his alter ego Wolmar is nearly complete, (Julie's tone and diction is reminiscent of St. Preux at the height of their erotic involvement. The temporal organization of her world is more than ever that of desire: "Tant qu'on desire on peut se passer d'être heureux; on l'attend à le devenir; si le bonheur ne vient point, l'espoir se prolonge, et le charm de l'illusion dure autant que la passion qui le cause. (Ainsi cet etat se suffit a lui-même, et l'inquietude qu'il donne est une sorte de jouissance qui supplée a la realite...On jouit moins de ce qu'on obtient que de ce qu'on espere, et l'on n'est heureux qu'avant d'être
heureux." (II 693). In the world of the affections, present anticipation substitutes for a future fulfillment known to be inadequate; the pattern is highly familiar from a lengthy series of "nostalgic" readings to which the works of Baudelaire, Rimbaud and Proust lend themselves deceptively well. This temporal structure differs in all respects from that of the promise as we derived it from the Social Contract. The promise establishes a relationship of constancy between a present enunciation and the future referent of this enunciation; it is affectively undetermined, for it is entirely irrelevant whether the enunciation or the execution of the promise are to be pleasant or painful. The semiological model is that of a relationship between enunciation and meaning, whose differences are reduced to the spacial metaphor of a definite time segment and thus lose the indeterminacy of a truly temporal system, open toward the future and "evermore to be". (Wordsworth). Desire, on the other hand, is purely referential( ); and is as such, the phenominal manifestation of the rhetorical fallacy of reference or, if one wishes to call it that way, the foundation of the (referential) conscious self. The temporality of desire is phenomenal and metaphysical, whereas the temporality of promise (which is precisely not hope) is, at least in part, the grammatical mode of a future tense that exists independently of referential considerations. Julie can therefore be expected to have little consideration for contractual promises: "La promesse qu'il faut tenir sans cesse est celle d'etre honnete-homme et toujours ferme dans son devoir; changer quand il change, ce n'est pas legerete, c'est constance. Vous faites bien, pert-etre, alors de promettre ce que vous feriez aujourd'hui de tenir." The very point of promise is that it is independent of selfhood and of the affective integration of intent to action (honnetete), so that the only thing that the promise can never promise
is the inconstancy which Julie advocates. The perfectly valid
that no promise can ever be kept can itself never be a statement of
promise, Julie could disavow her own marriage-contract in the name of
this statement, but this would go against the narrative logic of the
plot-structure. By putting this confusion within the context of a
tension between the grammatical logic of the plot and illocutionary
mode of the structure just quoted is delusive. In a passage like this,
the figure of Julie becomes estranged from her own text in a manner that
has never been allowed to occur earlier in the book. Not only is she
allowed to relapse into former patterns of error (which would be entirely
consistent with the structure of the novel as an allegory of non-signi-
ification or unreadability), but she is allow to flaunt the laws of her
own text which is based on promise (for instance, on the fact that the
marriage contract between Julie and Wolmar can never be revoked).
(This confusion on the textual level is characteristic of this version
of textual allegory).

The same confusion appears in the religious language of the same
three letters (6, 7 and 8), thus voiding the claim, made by many inter-
preters of the novel, including Starobinski, that a genuine religious
transendence takes over after the political plot has run aground.
The politics of Clarens and the religion of Julie go awry for exactly
the same reasons. For Julie's theology is much less consistent then
that of the Vicaire Savoyard. The Profession de Foi is genuinely am-
vivalent, in a manner determined by the conceptual and rhetorical ap-
paratus that governs it, whereas Julie's final letters are a suspended
state of systematic confusion. Engaged in serious theological argument
by St. Preux on the validity of prayer (the transcendental reverse of the
political promise of the Contract), she resorts to the same pragmatic
and affective justification for religious actions that also governs her
notions of civil virtue, extreme prosilytism, conversion, etc. ( )
The shift from the religious fervor that still comprises the prayer and
the devotional language of the marriage scene to the prudent piety of
the concluding letters is not the result of a demystification but of
an inability to distinguish between private and public happiness. Re-
ligion is to substitute for the unhappiness brought on by a sensibility
of desire: "Ne trouvant donc rien ici-bas qui lui suffise, mon ame
arride cherche ailleurs de quoi la remblir; en s'elevant a la source du
sentiment et de l'etre, elle y perd sa secheresse et sa langueur; elle
y renait, elle s'y ranime, elle y trouve un nouveau ressort, elle y
puille une nouvelle vie..." (694). We are exactly at the stage of
mystification that inspires the letters to Sophie. ( )

Neither does the end of Julie, the Socratic death scene
with its mixture of sentiment, parody, "folie" and genuine wisdom, in
any way convey the promise of a Vita Nova that re-elevates Julie's
language to the level of divine identification reached in the marriage
scene. The highly public death-scene, the discussions with Saint Preux
with regard to pietism, Madame Guyon and
all go
back to a more secular, public and social-minded religiosity, without,
however beginning to approach the radical secularization and politi-
zation of religion in the \textit{Contrat Social}. What exists in the violent
mode of tension and aporia in the \textit{Profession de Foi}, in the \textit{Social
Contract}, in "Du Bonheur Public", in letter 18 of part III of Julie and
even in the oddity of tone of the letters to Sophie, becomes systematic
confusion in Julie's last letters. It would be debilitating misreading
to interpret this confusion as a weakness of the novel or as a "criticism"
of the character Julie by its author. This would imply that \textit{La Nouvelle
Heloise} is a programmatic, ideological work advocating a specific con-
viction, and, consequently, a straightforward diegetic statement rather
than an allegory; Allegories do not "represent" or evaluate "characters"
The confusion instead indicates the deliberate refusal to promise a clarity that the epistemological and ethical de-constructions would have made possible. Such a renunciation could be stated in a variety of existential modes but, within the perspective of its textuality, it provides an alternative version of the plot narrated in the Social Contract. It would therefore be false to follow the suggestion of chronology and to consider Julie as a text that is still confused but that already contains the elements that will be sorted out and clearly organized in later works (such as the Social Contract). The relationship between the Nouvelle Heloise and the Social Contract is less simple: the confusion of the one affects the clarity of the other, and it is easier to move from the Social Contract to the Nouvelle Heloise than visa-versa.

The allegorical consistency of La Nouvelle Heloise is confirmed by the fact that Julie remains until the end the undisputed sovereign of Clarens, the monarch who has right of death and life over its inhabitants(1) and of whom Wolmar can say, "que nous sommes tous les sujets."(2) She remains the embodiment of a certain political order that will reveal the same confusions as her religious and erotic sensibility. Clarens both is and is not a state, even more obscurely so than the Profession de Foi is and is not a theist tract. It has all the systematic, hierarchical and legal superstructures of a state, but the foundations are ambivalent and undetermined. Like the family in "Du Bonheur Public", it is a mere extension of a private happiness to a collectivity; an attempt to achieve the reconciliation between family and state against which the first version of the Social Contract explicitly warns the theoreticians of politics (the readers of Barnet and Ramsay). Clarens allows for the "double perspective" of the general system as well as a structure of personal gratification. It
does not ignore the tensions stemming from the incompatibility between the two perspectives, for there are none of its pseudo-idyllic scenes (the garden of Julie, the wine-harvest, the "diner d'Apollon", the "matineee a l'anglaise") that contain all elements necessary to their affective reversal from pleasure into fear and embarrassment. But the tension refrains from explicit theorization: all the Clarens scenes are straight narratives, reported events and not the theoretical programs of the Social Contract; what they narrate, however, are theoretical pictures and assumptions. At stake here is not a generic distinction between a novel and a treatise, but a distinction in plot structure between texts that in spite of themselves have to be narratives as well as treatises.

The same systematic confusion between public and private well-being accounts for all the characteristic j of Clarens. Whereas "Du Bonheur Public" made it clear that the "happiness" of a state or society could only be evaluated with regard to another, foreign state, the relationship of Clarens towards anything exterior to itself (be it other estates, Geneva or Paris) is never considered. Like Julie's garden, except as a totally unknown place of banishment, whoever enters it forgets the existence of any outside world. Various political realities (the Valais, Paris) play an active part in the first part of the novel, but as soon as the plot becomes political, the outside world disappears. The absence of any stress on civil religion, in the political sense given to this term in the Social Contract, within the social fabric of Clarens, is equally symptomatic. Monsieur de Wolmar, the closest we have to a legislator of Clarens, is a non-believer, and Julie, his executive counterpart, must resign herself to this situation. The separation between her private religion and Wolmar's atheism is another instance of the confusion of thematization that the Social Contra
theorizes out of existence. Finally, as a last indication of a list that could and should be continued at length, the economy of Clarens is perhaps the most striking instance of the mutual contaminations of private and public spheres. This economy is described as strictly utilitarian, as steadily striving to unite "l'utile a l'agréable". It may therefore seem consistent that the main product of this economy would be wine, a commodity that pleasantly combines the satisfaction of needs with the luxury of pleasure. Yet pure wine, throughout the novel, in a chain of repeated figures that extends from the early Valais scene to the glass of undiluted wine Julie drinks on her deathbed is an emblem of temptation and excess, always associated with the overcome illusion of the unmediated communion of darkness and light. The insane spectacle of Claire in one of the last scenes of the novel, deluded into an endless game of sublimations as a deliberate and theatrical hoax that threatens to rob her of life and reason, and is the last in a sequence of Dionysian moments. Like the poison of the "Innoculation de l'amour", wine is the drug, the pharmakos, that destroys by healing, and, in Julie's socratic death scene, it functions like the hemlock that brings together disciples of Socrates. "On m'a fait boire jusqu'a la lie la coupe amere et douce de la Sensibilite"(III, 733); Julie's last statement brings together Euripides's Bacchae and Socrates into a juxtaposition that will also produce the "Dunkeles Licht" of Holderlin's poetry, in which Dyönon apears as the god of the general will (Gemeingeiss), and inspire Nietzsche's the Birth of Tragedy.

Rousseau always knew all there is to know about the Dionysian temptation of metaphor and his work reaches out well beyond the confines of this knowledge. The wine-producing Clarens, an entity that lives from the poison it produces, is too simple a paradox to justify the
complexity of this text. It is true, but it bears a deceptive resemblance to the world as we know it and thus contributes a powerful obstacle to the reading of *La Nouvelle Héloïse* as a non-representational, allegorical novel. But it is not easier to feign confusion in order not to promise than to promise (and hence, to lie) because the light cannot be conjured away. Rousseau's work has to be seen under the "double rapport" that makes his theory of figure into a generalized theory of textuality. For as long as there can be two textual plots, there can be many more. The promise withheld in the *Nouvelle Héloïse* and stated in the *Social Contract* can also be stated and withheld at the same time. It can become an ironic promise.